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Comments
INCONSISTENT PLEADING UNDER MISSOURI STATUTES
Ever since the enactment of the General Code for Civil Procedure in 1943,1 there
have been questions as to the effect of inconsistent pleading under this new code.

1.

Mo. Laws 1943, at 353-97, §§ 1-145.
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To best analyze this problem we will first compare the wording of the Missouri
statute with that of the federal rule concerning consistency of pleadings. The Missouri statute reads as follows: "A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A
party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has whether based on
legal or on equitable grounds or both."2 In contrast, the federal rule reads as follows:
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.
When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state
as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardlessof consistency and whether
based on legal or on equitable grounds or both. All statements shall be subject to
the obligations set forth in Rule 11."3 (Emphasis added.) As will be noted, the main
difficulty under the Missouri statute 4 is the omission of the words "regardless of
consistency."
At this point it might be well to define what is meant by "inconsistent pleading."
Decades of judicial interpretation and definition have given us a definition to the
effect that the pleading is inconsistent if proof of one of the allegations or defenses
will necessarily disprove the other.5 It has further been said that allegations in a
petition are not inconsistent unless they are such that, if the allegations supporting
one theory are true, the allegations supporting the other must be false. 6
The federal courts have almost universally construed the federal rule exactly to
its letter and as a result have allowed all claims 7 and defensess to be pleaded without
2. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2).
4. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
5. Carden v. Thompson, 333 Mo. 218, 62 S.W.2d 882 (1933); Finley v. Williams,
325 Mo. 688, 29 S.W.2d 103 (1930); Payne v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956);
Vaughn v. Conran, 20 S.W.2d 968 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Long v. Long, 167 Mo. App.
79, 150 S.W. 1135 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912); Cox v. Bishop, 55 Mo. App. 135 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1893).
6. Peterie v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 359, 164 S.W. 254 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1914).
7. Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952); Kentucky Home Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Durling, 190 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1951); Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 149
F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1945); Walla v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 17 F.R.D. 506 (D. Neb. 1955);
Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); United States v.
Fisher, 112 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Strauss v. Reading Co., 14 F.R.D. 457 (El).
Pa. 1953); Rosenberg v. Cohen, 9 F.R.D. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Townsend v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 7 F.R.D. 166 (D. Mass. 1945); Venn-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss
Sons Textile Mills, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.J. 1941); Kraus v. General Motors Corp.,
27 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
8. Jessen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1954); Washington
Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Snower & Co. v.
United States, 140 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1944); Langwood Products, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game
Corp., 9 F.R.D. 418 (EJ.XN.Y. 1949).
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regard to their consistency. They have even gone so far as to say that inconsistent
or alternative claims may be pleaded within a single count and a motion to dismiss
must be denied if the pleading is sufficient under any one of the theories pleaded. 9
They have even said that one, when asserting benefits under a contract, may at the
same time repudiate the contract and sue under the common counts on an implied
contract,lo and even that inconsistent claims for rescission and for breach of contract
may be joined in one pleading.1 The courts have also said that a party may plead
as many defenses as he has in his answer and if any defense is sustained, it is fatal
to the plaintiff's cause of action irrespective of the fact that the separate defenses
are inconsistent.12 It has also been held that, in an action for slander, the defendant
is permitted to deny the utterance of the slanderous words and also rely on the
defense of qualified privilege even though they are wholly inconsistent.13
After examining the import of the federal rule' 4 on the subject, the question is
presented as to the effect of the Missouri statute' 5 on inconsistency or repugnancy
in pleadings particularly in light of the absence of the words "regardless of consistency" from the text of the statute. In quest of a solution to this problem, we will
turn our attention next to the legislative background and history of what is now
section 509.110, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949).
In 1939 the general assembly invited the supreme court to make suggestions
for a revised code and rules of civil procedure and as a result the court appointed
a committee of fifty-three lawyers and judges to assist in the preparation of the
tentative proposals. In late 1940 the committee made its first report in which it
offered two alternate proposals. Plan I consisted of various amendments to the
present code and plan II completely revised eleven of the twenty articles of the
General Code for Civil Procedure. In 1941 the general assembly extended until the
1943 session the time for the court to submit the suggestions. The court then appointed a special committee to distribute the printed plans among the members of
the bar and to receive suggestions. As a result, the committee reported that the
prevailing sentiment of the bar was in favor of the adoption of plan 11. In November
1942 the original supreme court committee made its final report which, in consideration of the various suggestions, perfected plan II and submitted it to the supreme
court. At this point it might be observed that in plan H the section concerning inconsistent pleadingI6 was identical with the similar section of the Federal Rules of

9.

D. Loveman & Son, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 FED. RULEs SEav.

8e.611, Case 1 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (apparently the pleading was set up in the alternative, but the court treated alternative pleading synonymously with inconsistent
pleading).
10. Neumann v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 71 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. IMl. 1946).
11. Venn-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss Sons Textile Mills, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 4
(D.N.J. 1941).
12. Jessen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1954).
13. Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2).
15. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
16. P oposED REv-sED CODE oF CIVIL PRocEDuRE IN MissouR, art. 5, § 11 (1942).
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Civil Procedure 17 which did contain the words "regardless of consistency." The court
then proceeded to study plan H and reduce it to bill form. Among the changes made
by the supreme court was the elimination of the words "regardless of consistency"
s
from article 5, section 11 of plan Ia.1
The reason for the supreme court's striking of these words cannot easily be found.
Admittedly, by this move the court did not seek completely to condemn inconsistent
pleading as such, but on the other hand, it appears that the court did not wish to
give the comprehensive license to plead inconsistently that was provided for under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the result of this move
might be to permit inconsistent pleading in some instances while prohibiting it in
other instances. Further, it seems that the court felt there might be cases where a
pleading was so inconsistent that the opposing party would not know what the
pleader meant, and in those cases the inconsistent pleadings should not be allowed.
Subsequently, the bill was presented in the legislature and was passed into law
as the Civil Code of Missouri to take effect January 1, 1945.19 The section with which
we are concerned, section 42 of the Civil Code, as presented to the legislature and as
enacted did not contain the words "regardless of consistency," and it has remained
20
unchanged to date.
This brings us to the consideration of the problem as to what is the present
21
status of inconsistent pleading in Missouri. Under an early statute, it was held that
two inconsistent counts in a petition were bad against timely objection notwith22
standing the fact that they were pleaded in the alternative, and under a subsequent
statute23 it was held that a defendant might plead several defenses but that they
25
but
must be consistent.24 A later statute also permitted pleading in the alternative
20
was
It
consistent.
be
not
need
alternatives
the
that
statute,
that
it was held under
also required under the latter statute that the pleader declare his belief in one or
27
the other, but his ignorance as to which one it was. Under this same statute it
28
was required that each alternative state a good cause of action or defense, but
that has been changed by the present section so that the alternatives will be considered separately and the pleading will not be considered insufficient on the ground

17. FED. R. Crv. P. 8 (e) (2).
18. Teasdale, Progress of the Proposed Revised Code of Civil Procedure, 14 Mo.
BAi J. 38 (1943).
19. Mo. Laws 1943, at 357, §§ 2-3.
20. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
21. § 1828, RSMo 1909.
22. Wade v. Douglass, 161 Mo. App. 348, 143 S.W. 830 (Spr. Ct. App. 1912).
23. § 1233, RSMo 1919.
24. Vaughn v. Conran, 20 S.W.2d 968 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
25. § 798, RSMo 1929.
26. State ex rel. Dunklin County v. McKay, 325 Mo. 1075, 30 S.W.2d 83 (1930).
27. Manchester Iron Works v. E. L. Wagner Const. Co., 341 Mo. 389, 107 S.W.2d
89 (1937); Crowley v. Behle, 131 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939).
28. Duncan v. Thompson, 146 S.W.2d 112 (Spr. Ct. App. 1940), revid, 315 U.S.
1 (1941).
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that one of the alternatives is insufficient, provided, of course, there is at least one
alternative that states a good cause of action.29
Under the new code section,39 there is genuine confusion as to the present
permissibility of inconsistent pleading. It is felt by at least one writer that inconsistent claims, defenses, and facts must be pleaded in the alternative and if not
so pleaded, will be held defective. 31 Although there is little doubt as to the wisdom
of such a practice, I believe that such a comprehensive and categorical statement
might be misleading for the reason that there have been cases in which the courts
have held allegations and defenses which would seem on their face to be repugnant,
to be consistent when appearing in the same pleading. For example, the court has
found allegations of negligence and allegations of wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct
not to be necessarily repugnant. 32 And a court of appeals has found allegations that
the car was driven at a negligent rate of speed and allegations that it could have been
stopped and the collision avoided not to be necessarily inconsistent. 33 In other instances it has been held that allegations that defendant failed to have a truck under
control so as to be able to stop at the first sign of danger were not inconsistent with
allegations of negligence under the humanitarian rule. 34 It has also been held that
allegations that plaintiff was invited on the premises by defendant were not inconsistent with allegations that plaintiff was there with defendant's permission and
knowledge.3 5 One court has even gone so far as to say that a plea of general denial
and of contributory negligence in the same answer were not inconsistent defenses. 3 6
On the other hand, no cases can be found in which the court has denominated
allegations or defenses in a pleading to be inconsistent and has still allowed them to
stand. When the claims or defenses were inconsistent the courts have deemed them
insufficient 37 except when they were pleaded in the alternative. 38 But it should be
noted, there has been no case in which it was held, categorically, that the present
statute entirely prohibits inconsistent pleading.
Some writers have pointed out that alternative pleading and inconsistent pleading
are synonymous conceptions, but this seems to be a rather inaccurate presumption,
as the Missouri courts have not treated them as one and inseparable. A more accurate
concept would denominate an inconsistent pleading to be one in which the pleader
29. § 509.110, RSMo 1949, Goldman v. Ashbrook, 262 S.W.2d 165 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1953).
30. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
31.

1 CARm, MIssoURI CIvIi. PRocEmU

§ 171 (1947).

32. Cosentino v. Heffelfinger, 360 Mo. 535, 229 S.W.2d 546 (1950).
33. Benson v. Smith, 38 S.W.2d 743 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
34. Danklef v. Armbruster, 91 S.W.2d 660 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Pabst v. Armbruster, 91 S.W.2d 652 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936)
35. Gilliland v. Bondurant, 51 S.W.2d 559 (K.C. Ct. App. 1932), afrd, 332 Mo.
881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933).
36. Kleinlein v. Foskin, 321 Mo. 887, 13 S.W.2d 648 (1929).
37. National Lead Co. v. Nulsen, 131 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 758 (1943); Five Twelve Locust, Inc. v. Mednikow, 270 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1954);
DeVault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S.W.2d 29 (1946); King v. Guy, 297 S.W.2d
617 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956); Payne v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956); Schroeder
v. Johnson, 218 S.W.2d 982 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
38. Five Twelve Locust, Inc. v. Mednikow, supra note 37; State ex rel. Dunklin
County v. McKay, 325 Mo. 1075, 30 S.W.2d 83 (1930); King v. Guy, supra note 37.
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alleges two repugnant or mutually destructive claims or defenses in which the proof
39
of one would necessarily disprove the other and the pleader claims both to be true
and the opposing party cannot fully understand what is being claimed. In contrast,
an alternative pleading is one in which the pleader alleges one or the other of the
acts to be true, but not both, and the opposing party then has better information as
to what is being claimed. The claims or defenses might or might not be consistent
with each other, to wit, proof of one might or might not necessarily disprove the
other, but the important point to be remembered is that the pleader is claiming
either one or the other to be true-he is not claiming that both are true.
It is submitted that there are many instances in which the pleader will, of necessity, want to plead two or more different theories of law defensively, or in an attempt
to recover, and might wish to plead two or more sets of facts when the true course
of events is unknown and he is pleading on information and belief. But a mere
cursory glance at the various situations which might require the pleader to allege
repugnant claims or defenses will reflect the conclusion that, without reservation,
any time a pleader would have occasion to plead inconsistently, he could just as
easily draft his pleading in the alternative and accomplish the same purpose. When
the pleader sets up inconsistent allegations, he knows that one of the allegations
must of necessity be false and it is repugnant to common sense for a person to allege
two things to be true when if either one were found to be true the other, ipso facto,
would be false. The result of such pleading would accomplish no more than the
confusion of the opposing party.
The solution to our problem can be found in the drafting of the pleading. In
light of the fact that the words "regardless of consistency" were not included in the
41
it can be
Missouri statute 40 and in light of the court decisions on the matter,
On the
its
doom.
meet
well
might
very
inconsistent
which
is
seen that a pleading
other hand, the statute specifically allows pleading in the alternative and it has been
42
held that the alternatives need not be consistent with each other. This, then, can
be reconciled with the scheme of the supreme court in deleting the words "regardless
of consistency" from the proposed draft of the statute, to wit, to decrease the ambiguity created by inconsistent pleading. The result follows that one may plead two
or more repugnant claims or defenses provided he draft his pleadings in the alternative or the hypothetical, or at least draft the pleadings in a manner which will make
it very clear to the opposing party that the pleader is relying on either one or the
43
other of his inconsistent allegations, but not on both.
W=Ax M. HowAno

39. Carden v. Thompson, 333 Mo. 218, 62 S.W.2d 882 (1933); Finley v. Williams,
325 Mo. 688, 29 S.W.2d 103 (1930); Payne v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956);
Vaughn v. Conran, 20 S.W.2d 968 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Long v. Long, 167 Mo. App.
79, 150 S.W. 1135 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912); Cox v. Bishop, 55 Mo. App. 135 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1893).
40. § 509.110, RSMo 1949.
41. See notes 37 and 38 supra.
42. See note 38 supra.
43. See Hyde and Douglas, Pleading Provisions of the Civil Code Act of 1943,
15 Mo. BAR J. 71-76, 81-82, 99 (June 1944), republished in 2 CAna, MiSsoUI Civz
Paocmum 535, 540 (1947); 1 id. § 171.
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LIABILITY OF POSSESSOR OF PREMISES TO FIREMAN
INJURED THEREON
A possessor's liability to entering firemen has been announced for the first time

by the Supreme Court of Missouri in two recent cases-Anderson v. Cinnamon' and
Nastasio v. Cinnamon.2 In the Anderson case the plaintiff, a member of the Kansas
City fire department, was injured by the collapse of a porch on defendant's burning
apartment building, from which plaintiff was attempting to fight the fire. Plaintiff
alleged the defendant was on the premises at the time, had knowledge of plaintiff's

presence on the porch, and had knowledge that the porch was dangerous and unsafe.
Plaintiff based his claim on defendant's negligence in failing to repair the porch and
put it in a reasonably safe condition, and on defendant's negligent failure to warn
plaintiff of such condition of the porch and in permitting him to go into a dangerous
trap. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted and, on appeal, this was affirmed by the supreme court en banc.

In the Nastasio case, the plaintiff in a wrongful death action was the widow of
another member of the Kansas City fire department. Mr. Nastasio was off duty at
the time the alarm for the fire involved in the Anderson case was given, but responded to the alarm. He is described in plaintiff's petition as a "volunteer" who
".... 'proceeded to go upon said premises for the primary purpose of saving life and
limb of the tenants... ."' Due to mention and admission in briefs of the parties that
deceased was a member of the fire department, the petition was construed by the
court as containing this information. The theory of plaintiff's petition seems to be that
defendant's negligence placed the tenants of the building in danger to which deceased
3
responded and, while rescuing persons from the fire, the porches of the building
collapsed upon deceased due to the negligence of defendants in the maintenance of

the porches in a dangerous condition amounting to a trap, and in the failure of one
of the defendants present to warn deceased of the imminent danger of the porch's
collapse. The supreme court in division No. 1 affirmed the trial court's judgment of
dismissal of plaintiff's petition.4
In the Anderson opinion the court approaches the problem of the possessor's duty
5
to repair in this way: firemen are generally held to be licensees; a possessor's duty
to firemen is the same as that owed licensees; Missouri law is well settled that the
possessor owes no duty as to maintenance of premises toward a licensee, who takes
the premises as he finds them except for the possessor's (a) "wantoness" or (b) "some
6
form of intentional wrong," or (c) "active negligence"; and therefore since neither

1. 282 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
2. 295 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1956).
3. Apparently the same porches are involved in the Anderson case, supra note 1.
4. From the opinions in both cases, Westhues, J., dissented.
5. Generally said to be "under a commission to enter given by law." See
Annots., 13 A.L.R. 637, 638 (1921); 141 A.LR. 584 (1942); 122 AL.R. 1162 (1939); 61
AM.!.. 1028 (1929).

6. 282 S.W.2d at 447. On this point the court cites: Walters v. Markwardt, 361

Mo. 936, 237 S.W.2d 177 (1951); Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W.2d 820
(1945); Stevenson v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S.W.2d 260 (1941);
Twine v. Norris Grain Co., 241 Mo. App. 7, 226 S.W.2d 415 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
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(a), (b), or (c) above were present, there was no negligence in failure to repair on
the part of defendant.
The court in the Anderson case discusses the duty to warn a licensee in this
manner: there is a conflict of authority in the United States on the duty to warn; 7
cases on which plaintiff relies involve "unusual hazard from highly dangerous substances kept on the premises such as gasoline or explosive material";8 the Missouri
courts have never recognized a possessor's duty as outlined in the Restatement of
Torts;9 Missouri decisions do recognize the possessor's duty not to "'knowingly let
him [licensee] go into a hidden peril ... ' [but] we think the explosive material cases
are a good example of what is meant by letting one go into hidden peril ....
Thus
it is unusual hazard that requires warning to licensees";' 0 "We have never held there
is a duty to warn licensees of structural conditions, due to age and natural deterioration or to improper construction, or to warn of conditions due to casual negligence
of persons with respect to objects or materials not inherently dangerous . . .";11 the
rules applicable to unusual hazards should not be applied to structural conditions;
and in any event the petition shows insufficient opportunity to warn in alleging
merely that an owner (defendant) knew of plaintiff's presence on the porch.
As to plaintiff's position on appeal that under the pleaded facts defendant was

7. See annotations cited note 5 supra; Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co.,
232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn.
166, 66 N.W.2d 892 (1954); Fentress v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 149 Neb. 355, 31
N.W.2d 225 (1948); Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 42, 46 N.W.2d 769
(1951), modified on rehearing, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951); Gannon v. Royal
Properties, Inc., 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1954); Clinkscales v.
Mundkoski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P.2d 562 (1938); Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co., 204
S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
3. Cases on which plaintiff relied: Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc.
723, 194 Atl. 873 (1937); Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d
503 (1940); Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, 108 Ohio St. 377, 140 N.E. 770
(1923); Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, supra note 7.
9. 2 RESTATEmN, ToRTs §§ 342, 345 (1934). § 342: "Dangerous Conditions Known
to Possessor. A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a)
knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and
has reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising
reasonable care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to warn them of
the condition and the risk involved therein."
§ 345: "Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor. A possessor of land is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused by a natural or artificial condition thereon
to others who are privileged to enter the land for a public or private purpose, irrespective of his consent, if he (a) knows that they are upon the land or are likely to
enter it in the exercise of their privilege, and (b) knows of the condition and realizes
that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has no reason to believe that they
will discover the condition or realize the risk, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable
care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe or (ii) to warn them of the condition
and the risk involved therein."
10. Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
11. ibid.
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guilty of "active negligence," the court took the position that failure to warn is

negative rather than active in nature when such failure is not connected with affirmative conduct on the possessor's part.12
The precise holding of the Anderson case is this: "We limit our decision herein
to holding, where it is not alleged that the possessor of land was informed that firemen intended to enter and use the porch of his building with their fire-fighting equipment before they went on it, he cannot be held liable for failure to warn them to
leave it after he knew of their presence there. Our conclusion is that our law imposes
13
no duty to warn under such circumstances."
Judge Westhues in his dissenting opinion reasoned: "To say that a property owner
would be liable if he failed to warn firemen if he had opportunity to do so before
the firemen went onto a porch that he knew was likely to fall, and not be liable for
failure to warn after the firemen had entered upon the porch, is to draw a distinction
14
where no difference exists."'
Having taken its position in the Anderson case, the court in the Nastasio case
rejects the argument that deceased came under the rescue doctrine and was therefore
an invitee, because he was not in truth a volunteer but an admitted fireman. Deceased
was thus a licensee, with no duty owed to him with respect to repair, and "inasmuch
as there is no allegation in plaintiff's instant petition that the defendants knew that
plaintiff's decedent intended to enter the premises and be under the porch before
he went onto the premises, defendants cannot be held liable for failure to have
warned plaintiffs decedent to leave his position under the porch after defendants
15
knew of his presence there."'
Judge Westhues again dissented. Clarifying his position in the Anderson case,
he felt that firemen should not be treated as licensees, but believed them to be sui
generis,16 and as such they should be warned of at least unusual, hidden dangers,
when the possessor knows of them and has opportunity to warn. Whether the Ander12. The court's position seems sound. But see Niernberg v. Gavin, 123 Colo. 1,
224 P.2d 215 (1950) (en banc), noted, Active Negligence Toward Trespasser Includes
Omissions to Act, 23 Rocx- MT. L. REV. 476 (1951).
13. 282 S.W.2d at 450.
14. Id. at 451.
15. 295 S.W.2d at 121.
16. The leading case expressing this view is Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products
Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396, 45 N.W.2d 549, 550 (1951): "The first thing to be recognized
is that firemen, policemen, and similar personnel have a status sui generis." This
case (holding plaintiff fireman had stated a cause of action by alleging defendant
failed to warn of a dangerous wall before plaintiff inspected the premises to make
certain fire was out) apparently gave the court the most difficulty. It was distinguished as relying on explosion cases, the New York progeny of Meiers v. Fred Koch
Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920), and the RESTATEMENT ol ToRTs, which
the court thought inappropriate analogies for a structural condition case. The firemen have equally as good judgment due to experience as to the results of stresses
and strains on structural conditions as the possessor. Further the Missouri court
felt inspection to see if a fire were out "might" justify the use of the rule as to
inspectors (Jennings v. Industrial Paper Stock Co., 248 S.W.2d 43 (K.C. Ct. App.
1952)), wheras in the two instant cases the work of fire fighting was in progress at
the time of injury.
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son porch should be considered such a hidden danger should have been, in his opinion,
a question for the jury.
A review of firemen cases suggests that-as a facet of the many cases involving
a possessor's liability to entrants'7-they continue to evidence the same liberalizing
forces suggested in 1936, when Dean McCleary wrote: 1 8
"Thus the law pertaining to the rights and duties of a possessor of land,
having for its roots the traditional position of the possessor which recognized
the right of a petty sovereign to use his land as he pleased and to determine
for himself in what condition he would keep the premises, is developing
rights and duties founded in the modern principles of tort law. This change of
approach to the problems of liability of a possessor of land emphasizes the
interest of society in preserving the safety of its members, but recognizing at
the same time the legitimate interests of possessors to the use of their land."
This liberalizing trend was further recognized by Professor James in 1953:19
"It would be surprising, however, if the general trend over the last one hundred years towards wider accident liability had left the land occupier's citadel
untouched. It has not. The tendency of the law, here as elsewhere, has been
towards an ever fuller application of the requirement of reasonable care
under all the circumstances, and this tendency has included something of the
leavening which has taken place generally within the negligence principle
itself so as to make it approach a system of liability without fault." 20
The possessor's conduct, when liability is attached to it, is said to be negligent,
but decisions are reluctant to analyze the possessor's conduct in terms of the reasonable man of negligence law generally. Rather, as did the Missouri court, the emphasis
is upon the status of the entrant. Is he trespasser, licensee, invitee, business visitor,'
licensee with license given by law, or sui generis? Once we find the entrant's status,
then the courts proceed to apply more or less rigidly defined standards of care 21
to what the defendant has or has not done. Although the standards of care as set
out in the Restatement of Torts22 generally amount to what a reasonable man would
do in each of the various circumstances outlined, even there the possessor's conduct
is not discussed in terms of reasonableness. This is due, it is believed, not only to the
fact that this area cuts across legally protected interests in property and legally
protected interests of members of society, but also to the fact that within the field

17. For a general discussion of the possessor's liability see the annotations and
cases cited notes 5 and 7, supra; 38 Am. JuR., Negligence §§ 92-141 (especially § 125)
(1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 23-89 (especially § 35) (1950); PaosszR, TORSs, c. 15
(especially § 78) (2d ed. 1955). Related material on a possessor's duty in Missouri
may be found in: McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to
Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. Rzv. 45 (1936); Tipton, Liability of Possessor of Premises to Governmental Employees, 2 Mo. L. Rzv. 110 (1937).
18. McCleary, supra note 17, at 60.
19. James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 631
YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
20. See e.g., EHBREWEiG, NEGIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
21. See 2 REsTATzizuT, TORTS §§ 329-50 (1934).
22. Ibid.
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of tort law itself what has caused the injury in most of the cases had been the failure
of the defendant to act affirmatively. When a court says, for example, that a plaintiff
has stated a cause of action by alleging defendant's failure to warn of a dangerous
condition, the court is penalizing inaction and increasing for the future the burdens
of property ownership. This is liability for omissions and it has always been hard
come by in the law.2 3 Without finding some relational connection between plaintiff
and defendant no duty to take affirmative action is found. This has been the approach.
And with it has come an indefinitely large number of decisions devoted to whether
plaintiff X is a licensee, invitee, or trespasser. Though this approach does not properly
focus the court's attention on the reasonableness of defendant's conduct,24 as an
analysis based on negligence would suggest, the conventional analysis will be slow
2
in giving way. 5
The liberalization which interjects itself in this area of the law will come about
by the recognition of a type of entrant as "sui generis" 2 6 to whom a duty is owed,
or by placing the entrant within a class of persons to whom a sufficient duty is owed
to warrant a recovery under the facts of a particular case.27
With respect to firemen, liberalization is shown in those cases analyzed by the
Missouri court as involving unusual hazards from highly dangerous substances kept
on the premises, 28 wherein recovery was allowed and which the Missouri court would
apparently approve. The Missouri court has further suggested another possible extension of the possessor's liability where the defendant knew the fireman was about to
enter the defendant's property to fight the fire and there was sufficient time to have
given an opportunity to warn of dangerous conditions which the fireman might encounter. It is believed, however, that Judge Westhues in his dissenting opinions
properly points his inquiry at the defendant's conduct and not to the plaintiff's status.
With respect to city officers and employees such as firemen, who have access to
private premises under license of law rather than from the possessor's consent or
invitation, and whose entry is principally beneficial to the public generally, it is

23. See Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56
U. PA. L. RPv. 217 (1908), and PRossEa, TORTs, Acts and Omissions, § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
It has always seemed incongruous to the writer for the law to recognize no general
duty to rescue those in peril, and yet accept Justice Cardozo's dictum, "The risk of
rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the
man." Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
24. See Law Reform Committee (England) Third Report, Cinm. No. 9305 (1954);
Dribben, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REv.
186 (1957); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 183, 359 (1953).
25. See Wolfson v. Chelist, 278 S.W.2d 39 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955), aff'd, 284 S.W.2d
447 (1955), holding a social guest to be a licensee, and rejecting a different analysis.
26. Firemen were so held in Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn.
394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951).
27. Voluntary firemen held an invitee, Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, 183 Okla. 12,
79 P.2d 562 (1938). Note also, the plaintiff's attempt in the Nastasio case to bring
deceased within the category of an invitee via the rescue doctrine.
28. See cases cited note 8 supra.
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29
Each Missouri municipality may elect to
believed a partial solution is available.
80
The allowance of this type
bring itself within the workmen's compensation law.
of recovery would not only compensate presently otherwise helpless plaintiffs, but
has the merit of spreading the risk of loss among the property owners of the city

who stand to gain most from fire protection as the insurance coverage could be purchased with tax revenue. As in the field of industry, certain personal injuries are
inevitable among city firemen, and compensation therefore should be viewed as a
81

legitimate expense of city government.

Jom

F. STAPLETON

MISSOURI LAW ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OF SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS
The rule to which the courts in Missouri have unanimously adhered is that, in
an action based on negligence, evidence of subsequent repairs is inadmissible for
the purpose of showing, or of raising an implication of an admission of, negligence on
the part of the defendant.'

In support of the rule it has been stated that if such

29. Admittedly the suggestion in this paragraph skirts the real point in issue, i.e.
whether the possessor has acted reasonably under the circumstances, nor does it
consider what problems may remain under possible subrogation provisions in policies
of insurance which the cities might take out. Rather it seeks only to compensate the
injured employee.
30. Although primarily the employments by municipal corporations are excluded
from Missouri's Workmen's Compensation Law (§ 287.090, RSMo 1949), municipalities may elect to come within the act (§ 287.030, RSMo 1949). However, of
the major Missouri cities, only Columbia has made such an election with respect to
their firemen. Mr. Spencer H. Givens, Director of the Division of Workmen's Compensation, in a letter to the writer commented, ".... As you know, of course the law
specifically exempts municipalities and Kansas City, St. Louis, Springfield, and St.
Joseph have not overcome that exemption by written acceptance. Some autonomous
units of the larger cities have filed acceptances of the law; for example the municipal
utilities of Springfield, Missouri ......
31. With respect to the workmen's compensation insurer's rights of subrogation,
see Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1269, 1271, nA (1951) and cases there cited. As to public
officers being included within provisions of workmen's compensation acts referring
to "employees," see Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 415 (1949). With respect to the right of firemen and policemen to recover under workmen's compensation acts generally, see
Annot., 10 A.L.R. 201 (1921).
1. Columbia & P. S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Henwood v. Chaney,
156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946); Hickey v. Kansas City
So. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956); Wallingford v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis,
337 Mo. 1147, 88 S.W.2d 361 (1935); Derrington v. Southern Ry., 328 Mo. 283, 40
S.W.2d 1069 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 662 (1931); Schloemer v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 204 Mo. 99, 102 S.W. 565 (1907); Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, 87 S.W. 1182
(1905); Mahaney v. St. Louis & H. Ry., 108 Mo. 191, 18 S.W. 895 (1892); Alcorn v.
Chicago & A. Ry., 14 S.W. 943 (1890), affd on rehearing, 16 S.W. 229 (1891), afpd by
court en banc, 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891); Brennan v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S.W.
481 (1886); Hipsley v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B. R.R., 88 Mo. 348 (1885); Ely v. St.
Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 77 Mo. 34 (1882); Gignoux v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 180
S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944); Brule v. Mayflower Apartments Co., 113 S.W.2d 1058
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evidence were admitted it would afford no legitimate basis for construing such an
act as an admission of previous neglect of duty; it would introduce into the transaction a new element and test of negligence; it would unjustly penalize the person
who, out of an overabundance of caution and acting in accordance with the promptings of humanity, takes steps to prevent the recurrence of such an accident; and it
would hold out an inducement for continued negligence (if, indeed, there were any
negligence at the outset) in that it would tend to restrain the making of needful
repairs after the accident for fear it would be taken as a tacit admission of negligence
in failing to have made the repairs prior to the injury. Thus it would establish a new
standard of care by which liability for the previously existing condition might be
2
measured.
Although the rule is that evidence of subsequent repairs is inadmissible to show
negligence, it is sometimes admissible as bearing on issues other than negligence. 3
Thus, frequently evidence of susequent repairs is admitted to show that a defective
road or sidewalk had been accepted by the city as previously dedicated, or was under
the defendant's possession, management, and control, and was therefore something
that the defendant was bound to repair.4 This sort of evidence has been admitted to
show that conditions at the time of an accident were different from the conditions

(St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921); Bujalo v. St.
Louis Basket and Box Co., 227 S.W. 844 (St. L. Ct. App. 1921); Phillips v. Hamilton
Brown Shoe Co., 178 Mo. App. 196, 165 S.W. 1183 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914); Minea v. St.
Louis Cooperage Co., 179 Mo. App. 705, 162 S.W. 741 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); Miniea
(sic) v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 175 Mo. App. 91, 157 S.W. 1006 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913);
Clonts v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 160 Mo. App. 456, 140 S.W. 970 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911);
Tetrick v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. App. 355, 107 S.W. 418 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908); Bokamp
v. Chicago & A. Ry., 123 Mo. App. 270, 100 S.W. 689 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907); Schermer
v. McMahon, 108 Mo. App. 36, 82 S.W. 535 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904); Woods v. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry., 51 Mo. App. 500 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892); Bowles v. Kansas City, 51 Mo. App.
416 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892); Mitchell v. Plattsburg, 33 Mo. App. 555 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
See also Brown v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 212 Mo. App. 541, 248 S.W. 12 (Spr. Ct. App.
1923).
2. See the following cases cited note 1 supra: Columbia & P. S. R.R. v.
Hawthorne, Alcorn v. Chicago & A. Ry., Gignoux v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,
Brule v. Mayflower Apartments Co., Minea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co.
3. Henwood v. Chaney, suipra note 1; Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 177
S.W.2d 608 (1944); Wagner v. Gilsonite Construction Co., 220 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1920); the
following supreme court cases cited note 1 supra: Hickey v. Kansas City Southern
Ry., Wallingford v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, Derrington v. Southern Ry.,
Bujalo v. St. Louis Basket and Box Co., Schloemer v. St. Louis Transit Co., Alcorn v.
Chicago &A. Ry., Brennan v. St. Louis; Bianchetti v. Luce, 222 Mo. App. 282, 2 S.W.2d
129 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928); the following court of appeals cases cited note I supra:
Brule v. Mayflower Apartments Co., Phillips v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., Clonts v.
Laclede Gaslight Co., Tetrick v. Kansas City, Woods v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., Mitchell
v. Plattsburg; Rusher v. City of Aurora, 71 Mo. App. 418 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897);
Walker v. Town of Point Pleasant, 49 Mo. App. 244 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
4. Brennan v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S.W. 481 (1886) (street); Brule v.
Mayflower Apartments Co., 113 S.W.2d 1058 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938) (evidence relating
to a post was admitted but jury instructed not to consider it because ownership of
post was later admitted by defendant); Bianchetti v. Luce, supra note 3 (sidewalk);
Rusher v. City of Aurora, supra note 3 (sidewalk); Walker v. Town of Point Pleasant,
supra note 3; Woods v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 51 Mo. App. 500 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892)
(gateposts); Mitchell v. Plattsburg, 33 Mo. App. 555 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
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shown in a photograph which defendant proposed to exhibit to the jury showing the
5
scene of the accident. In Alcorn v. Chicago & A. Ry.,G the witness testified that on
the day following the accident he had seen a new wooden block between the rails at
the point where the injury had occurred. The majority opinion held that this evidence
was inadmissible. However, the minority opinion thought the testimony should be
admitted on the ground that there was an issue whether the block added anything
to the safety of the men. Such evidence is also admissible to rebut the testimony of
the defendant's witness that no repairs were made.7
If the defendant asks his witness about repairs, he has opened the subject, and it
is proper for the plaintiff to cross-examine the witness as to any and all repairs which
have been made. 8
The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that letters written by the defendant
relating to future protective measures which it was going to take were admissible by
the plaintiff because the defendant had alleged that the chemical to which the
9
plaintiff had been exposed was not harmful.
Evidence of subsequent repairs by the defendant has been admitted where its
effect is to show that the defendant had, after the accident, made the repairs in order
to conceal a condition alleged by plaintiff as showing the manner in which the
accident happened.' o
There are several cases in Missouri where the issue has arisen as to the practicability of installing a protective device on a machine or in a certain area. The
fact that after the plaintiffs accident the employer had installed various protective
devices or taken some protective measure has been admitted as showing the practicability of guarding the machine."
Where the defendant's opening statement raised the inference that a gutter could
not be filled due to the drainage problem, the court allowed photographs showing

5. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760
(1946). See also Gignoux v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 180 S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1944) in which this rule is impliedly recognized, although the issue was not
before the court.
6. 16 S.W. 229 (1891), affd by court en bane, 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891).
7. Schloemer v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 99, 102 S.W. 565 (1907).
8. Clonts v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 160 Mo. App. 456, 140 S.W. 970 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1911).
9. Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 177 S.W.2d 608 (1944).
10. Wallingford v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1147, 88 S.W.2d
361 (1935). See also Derrington v. Southern Ry., 382 Mo. 283, 40 S.W.2d 1069 (1931),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 662 (1931). Cf. Hardwick v. Kansas City Gas Co., 195 S.W.2d
504 (Mo. 1946).
11. Wagner v. Gilsonite Construction Co., 220 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1920) ("We know
of no more effective or cogent proof of [the practicability of the protective measure]
than proof of the fact that it was actually done whether before or after the accident."
p. 898); Bujalo v. St. Louis Basket and Box Co., 227 S.W. 844 (St. L. Ct. App. 1921);
Phillips v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 178 Mo. App. 196, 165 S.W. 1183 (K.C. Ct. App.
1914); Miniea (sic) v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 175 Mo. App. 91, 157 S.W. 1006 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1913) (dictum).
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alterations which were made subsequent to the accident. The court said the evidence
was admissible to rebut evidence or contentions that the use or condition then existing could not have been improved or made safer, or that such condition was a neces12
sary one.
On the other hand, where there is no issue in the case other than negligence, or
where the fact upon which the evidence would properly bear has been admitted by the
defendant to be true, or where there is ample proof of a fact from other means and
the obvious purpose of the evidence is to get before the jury some implication of
negligence on the part of the defendant, then the evidence of subsequent repairs has
been said to have no proper place in the case. 13

12. Hickey v. Kansas City So. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956) ("We think of no
better way to show that fact than proof that it actually was so reconstructed." p. 62).
13. Dimond v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 141 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1940)
(evidence of subsequent replacement of warning system did not tend to prove crossing was extra hazardous or unusually dangerous or that appellant knew thereof
prior to respondents injury); Bond v. Weiner, 140 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1940) (evidence
of repair of coal-hole cover properly excluded; it would not have given owner or
tenant of building any notice of anything not already known); Boone v. St. Joseph,
1 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1927) (action of trial court in refusing to allow defendant to show
who made repairs after the accident said valid); Marshall v. Kansas City, 297 Mo.
304, 249 S.W. 82 (1923) (no claim that original plank walk was improperly constructed); Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, 87 S.W. 1182 (1905) (no issue in case
upon which evidence could be admitted, since stipulation of facts modified general
denial in that city admitted sidewalk was under its control); Mahaney v. St. Louis
& H. Ry., 108 Mo. 191, 18 S.W. 895 (1892) (only purpose of evidence was to show
consciousness of defendant at time of accident that track was dangerous); Alcorn v.
Chicago & A. Ry., 14 S.W. 943 (1890) (only apparent purpose of evidence was to
establish an implied admission by defendant that he was negligent toward plaintiff),
affd on rehearing, 16 S.W. 229 (1891) (no proper issue raised by pleadings; not a
particle of testimony was offered to show who made the repairs; other testimony
could have been introduced to show necessity for proper block; evident and only
object of evidence was to convict defendant company of a confession of negligence
because of making repairs; misleading), affd by court en banc, 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W.
188 (1891); Hipsley v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B. R.R., 88 Mo. 348 (1885) (no proper
issue in case); Ely v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry. 77 Mo. 34 (1882) (no proper issue in
case); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Ct. App.
1948) (no bearing on issue being tried-an attempt to show replacement of machinery
for purpose of impeaching statement of defendant's witness that a tack could not get
into a bottle in the machine, but witness had explained that new machinery was
necessary because production had doubled); Gignoux v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,
180 S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944) (condition not an issue before jury); Cannon
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 233 Mo. App. 173, 116 S.W.2d 559 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938) (defendant
introduced photograph showing repairs, but court refused to allow him to show who
had made them, it being immaterial under the circumstances of the case); Brule v.
Mayflower Apartments Co., 113 S.W.2d 1058 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938) (evidence admitted
without objection, but court, at close of case, instructed jury not to consider the
evidence since defendant had specifically admitted ownership of the post in question);
Minea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 179 Mo. App. 705, 162 S.W. 741 (St. L. Ct. App.
1913) (evidence of subsequent repair not admissible as showing, as a matter of fact,
it was possible to guard the machine); Miniea (sic) v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 175
Mo. App. 91, 157 S.W. 1006 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913) (evidence of subsequent protective
measure stricken by trial court; court of appeals held evidence should not have been
admitted because the issue of the possibility of guarding machine could have been
and was shown by other evidence); Tetrick v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. App. 355, 107
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Evidence of subsequent repairs is generally said to be unfairly prejudical. 1 4
However, it is not so prejudicial as to require reversal where an objection to it is
sustained, and the testimony is ordered stricken.' 5 The court has also refused to
recognize such testimony as reversible error when the defendant has failed to make a
motion to strike it.' c And it has been said that if defendant allows some evidence of
repairs to be admitted without objection, he cannot thereafter be heard to complain
that similar evidence was improperly admitted over his objection.17
It would seem to be obvious that where the evidence is admissible for some other
purpose than to show negligence, a specific objection to the evidence would be
required, and admission of the evidence over a general objection would not constitute reversible error.1 8 But when the evidence is not admissible for any purpose,
a general objection will be sufficient. 19 A general objection to the evidence of subsequent repairs has been sustained for the reason that (1) no proper issue was raised
by the pleadings, (2) no testimony was offered to show who made the repairs, and
(3) other testimony could readily have been introduced to show the necessity for the
2
repairs. O
When the evidence is properly admissible, it would seem to be expedient for the
defendant to request the court at that time to tell the jury the purpose for which it is
admitted, and to request a like instruction to the jury at the close of the case. There
should be no question but that it is the duty of the defendant to request these
instructions limiting the jury in its consideration of evidence of subsequent repairs,2 1

S.W. 418 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (avowed object of evidence was to show place of
injury, but this was held to be mere evasion since place could be shown in a
number of ways); Bokamp v. Chicago & A. Ry., 123 Mo. App. 270, 100 S.W. 689 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1907) (subsequent method of operation inadmissible as tending to imply
prior method was dangerous and as showing safer methods could have been used);
Schermer v. McMahon, 108 Mo. App. 36, 82 S.W. 535 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904) (evidence
of subsequent bracing of trench inadmissible as tending to impress jury with belief
that at the time of the injury the sides of the trench were unsupported or unbraced);
Bowles v. Kansas City, 51 Mo. App. 416 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892) (evidence of repair
inadmissible because there was no evidence associating repairmen with defendant).
14. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760
(1946); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Ct. App.
1948).
15. Miniea (sic) v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 175 Mo. App. 91, 157 S.W. 1006 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1913).
16. Minea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 179 Mo. App. 705, 162 S.W. 741 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1913).
17. Wallingford v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1147, 88 S.W.2d
361 (1935).
18. Henwood v. Chaney, supra note 14; Brennan v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S.W.
481 (1886); Phillips v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 178 Mo. App. 196, 165 S.W. 1183
(K.C. Ct. App. 1914); Clonts v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 160 Mo. App. 456, 140 S.W.
970 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
19. Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, 87 S.W. 1182 (1905).
20. Alcorn v. Chicago & A. Ry., 16 S.W. 229 (1891), affd by court en bane, 108
Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891).
21. Woods v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 51 Mo. App. 500 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892).
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and the court's failure to give such an instruction, if not requested by the defendant,
should not be reversible error. 22 Yet, in the second Minea case 23 the court, before
admitting the evidence (which would have been proper as showing that it was
possible to guard a machine), engaged in a discussion with the lawyers as to the
admissibility of the evidence. Although the court finally admitted the evidence, it
failed to instruct the jury thereon, and no ruling was made by which the attention of
the jury was called to the fact that it was admitted subject to any limitation. On
appeal the court held that while it is the general rule that it is the duty of counsel
to ask an instruction limiting testimony admitted to a particular purpose, that rule
had no application here. The admission of the evidence without qualification and
without calling the attention of the jury to the fact that it was admitted for a specific
purpose only, was under the circumstances held to be reversible error.
In Wright v. Hines, 24 evidence of repair was offered for the purpose of showing
that the defendant exercised control over a walk, and not as an admission of
negligence in failing to keep the walk in repair. The court did not explain the
purpose for which this testimony was admitted. The defendant offered no instruction
limiting the effect of the testimony, and the court gave none. The court then granted
the defendant's motion for a new trial. Although the court of appeals decided that
the action of the trial court in this particular case was not vital, it said the better
practice is to give the explanation to the jury at the time of the admission of the
evidence, and also at the close of the case. The granting of the new trial was affirmed.
The court added (by way of a warning) that should the case be retried and the same
evidence be offered, the jury's attention should be called to the purpose for which it is
admitted at the time.
Thus, it can be seen that, on the whole, the Missouri law on the admissibility of
evidence of subsequent repairs is well settled. All the cases recognize the general
rules. The only variations appear in the application of those rules to particular cases.
A logical pattern is followed which generally attains an equitable result.
Louis F. Co=Iy

22. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760
(1946); Schloemer v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 99, 102 S.W. 565 (1907); Woods
v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., supra note 21; Brennan v. St. Louis, supra note 18.
23. Minea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 179 Mo. App. 705, 162 S.W. 741 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1913).
24. 235 S.W. 831 (Spr. Ct. App. 1922).
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